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Frankfurt university,_where he was infruenced byTheodor Adorno and Max Uorkh.i_rr. As a profes_sor ar Frankfurt Universiry from 1964 to 1971 andfrom 1983 to 1993;HabËrmas S*. " decisive newimpulse to the Frankfurrer Schulã 1E *Uurtl.fräåil
and its neo-Marxist critical theory of \X/estern socì_
efy and culture.
Habermas is the author of a series of influential
books, srarring with The Structural Trinsformation
"f.r!, Public Sphere:.An Inquiry ntá a Categoryof Bourgeois Society (I962),t" ir" cãnstitution ofpublic opinion through ,easoned discussion. Here,
he shows how the participation of all citizens inpublic dialogue, intimately .orrrr..r.J ro the riseof democratic societies, is in p..-nrr"rr, durg., of
degradation to commercialism, .orrrlrÃårirm, enter_
tainment, or too much influence of experts_to
interactions purely about means, no longer about
goals. That analysis Éoreshado*.á k.y themes of his
tater work, which culminated and were synthesized
in his 1,000-page magnum opus, The îørory i¡
Communicatiue Action (19g1),ìn tío uolu_.s, with
the telling subtitles Reason oid th, Rationarization
?ls:r*r1 and Lifeworld and System: A Critiqueol Þunctionalist Reason. The book analyrr" ,'ru_
sonable inreracion in cultural lifeworlds'and the
democratic and legal systems fo""d.J i, that inter_
action, and it shows how it is continually threatened
by the sysremic consrraints of po*;; óofitics) anàmoney (economy). Between Facts ànd Norms:
Contributions to a Discourse Theory of Law and
lemocla.c!.(J992), anorher major *árk, draws our
tne polrtrcal, legal, and institutional implications of
the theory of communicative action. 
r--
Jürgen Habermas (1929_ ) is by far the most
influential German. philosopher, social th.oriri,
political thinker, and þublic intellectual of th. pãrt
several decades. He has contributed d..iriu"lf tã
philosophy and the orher humanities, the social sci-
ences) the foundations of democracf and law, and
the cultural critique of industrial ,o.i.ti.r. \üØhat he
has ro offer to anthropologists is some of the most
relevanr insights and ãpproaches from continenrâl
European philosoph¡ 
"rhi.h 
he develops in an_for
a thinker f¡om this background_."iruordinarily
strong interaction with the social s.ien.es arrå
awa-reness of the problems of modern societies.
Habermas's cenrral gy.r!¡o_" throughout his richly
varied career has been this: What is, aãd what shoulåit be, to be human? He has developed an answerin terms of, first, a critique of reductionist views
of agency and a call for reasonable, intersubjectiue
agency.and dialogue, in everyday life as well as in law
and politics, and, second, an'análysis of the threats to
which autonomous ag_ency is exposed in contempo_
rary indusffial sociery. In the folloiing, the main lines
of his fully flecl€ed position will be,tãi.n.¿, focusing
on these two themes and the relevance of his hermeï
neutic (interpretive) philosophy for anthropology.
Life and'Works
Habermas grew up in a prorestant upper_middle_class
famrly rn Germany. He studied and subsequently
taught philosophy in various universities, inËtuaing
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In developing his theor¡ Habermas has critically
synthesized insights from Immanuel Kant, Karl
Marx, Max \Øeber, and Émile Durkheim, and his
work has been inspired by phenomenology and
hermeneutics, pragmatism, and analytical phi-
losophy. He has been characterized as a Marxist
'Weber, or a'W'eberian Marxist. He has engaged in
debates and dialogues with, among others, more
positivistically minded social scientists such as
Niklas Luhmann; with postmodern thinkers such as
Jacques Derrida and Richard Rorty; with Cardinal
Joseph Ratzinger, who became Pope Benedict XM;
and with determinist neuroscientists. The public
debates he contributed to include the struggle to
come to terms with the German past, the role of
religion as a source of meaning in sociery the ethics
of eugenics and biotechnology, postnationalism, and
the implications of neuroscience for free ageîcy.
Habermas retired in 1.993 but has kept publish-
ing, particularly in the context of various public
debates, lecturing internationall¡ not the least in
the United States, and receiving some of the highest
awards, in Germany and abroad.
Reasonable Dialogue
The key el8ment of Th e Th eory of Communicatiue
Action is a hermeneutic microanalysis of everyday
linguistic communication, embedded in local cul-
tural lifeworlds. The analysis then broadens to the
macro themes law, democracy, and technocracy in
modernized societies and a theory of modernization.
Habermas analyzes "reasonable" human commu-
nication âs a process of achieving, sustaining, and
reviewing mutual understanding, in a game of give-
and-take of good-reasonable and acceptable-
reasons, of discussion of the validity of claims that
are made. Every speech act in that game has a
performative aspect-something is asserted, prom-
ised, asked for, and so on-and makes three differ-
ent validity claims that are equally important, not
reducible to one another, and intricately intertwined:
(1) theoretical truth (regarding "it," what the facts
are), (2) normative rightness (regarding "we," what
we think is right), and (3) expressive or subjective
truthfulness (regarding "me," what I feel and think).
Reasonable human communication, Habermas
argues, is thus oriented to achieving consensus on
the basis of intersubjective recognition of criticiz-
able validity claims. In this sense, human âgency
is responsible-agents have to respond to critical
questions, to justify their actions with good argu-
ments, in everyday life, in courts of law, and in
parliament. Accountable agency (uerantwortliche
U r h eb er s ch aft), in F{ab ermas's formalist, procedural
view of interaction, has to do with the form, not
the contents, of communication. His political ideal,
therefore, is (formal) solidarity among strangers,
who respectfully remain strange to one another as to
the contents of their beliefs and values. In the back-
ground, however, there is always the threat of a nar-
rowing down of the interaction to strategic aspects,
to tactical power plays. This happens when the
interlocutors stop responding seriously to arguments
and resort to purely instrumental rationality instead,
such as rhetoric, ruse, or force-in such cases, the
reasonable nature of interaction disappears.
This hermeneutic, normative philosophy of
dialogue argues against positivistic or scientistic
reduction of the I-you, intersubjective participants'
perspective, which is so important to anthropol-
ogy. It objects to a purely third-person perspective
of agenc¡ processes of communication, and validity
claims. Such claims, in Habermas's view, can never
be fully accounted for in terms of purely factual
processes. Functionalist approaches in the social sci-
ences reduce the richness of human interaction to its
strategic aspect and miss out on its concern, always
and everywhere, with reasonableness as a counter-
factual regulative principle. \Øith all this, in particu-
lar the implied view, and promise, of the universal,
trans- and intercultural reasonableness of human
interaction in a formal sense, Habermas is one of
the most interesting philosophical interlocutors for
anthropology as a discipline that tends to conceive
of itself as not just a human but also a humane, criti-
cally engaged science.
Endangered Lifeworlds
Habermas's analysis of emancipative commu-
nicative reason, much indebted to Immanuel Kant
and Enlightenment thought, broadens to a political
philosoph¡ and a political economy of neo-Marxist
inspiration. Habermas shows how, in the course of
the past few centuries, systemic aspects of society
have come to threaten the reasonableness of human
interactions in local cultural lifeworlds. Bureaucratic
power and monetary exchange, both focused on
strategic rationality-the "functionalist reason"
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from the subtitle of the second volume of Tbe Theory
of Communicatiue Action-have "colonized" and
corrupted the lifeworld and the public sphere. The
strâtegic, instrumental rationality of state and the
market now operates on its own terms to a consider-
able extent, without social grounding. It bypasses
consensus-oriented communication and threatens to
fully determine what happens in human lives and
lifeworlds. In a truly deliberative, parliamentary
democrac¡ it should be the other way around: The
legitimacy of the state should result from the will or
consent of its people, who are sovereign, the source
of all political power.
Habermas criticizes modern, globalized civi-
Iization as a technocÍacy) in which, for example,
multinational corporations intrude into the politi-
cal process and, through control of the market and
publicit¡ into personal lives. Here, the¡ instead of
the people themselves, determine what one should
eat and how one should raise one's children, dress,
or spend one's leisure time. In processes of com-
modification and alienation, human and social val-
ues become market values. Habermas criticizes Max
'Weber, Niklas Luhmann, and Talcott Parsons for
overstressing functionalist rationality and systemic
aspects in their"reductionist views of modernization
and modernity.
Anth rop o I o gy an d Enli gh t enment
It is surprising that Habermas's normative phi-
losophy of what it means to be human has not been
more influential in anthropology, the comparative
study of humankind. This discipline also draws on
Marx, Durkheim, and \X/eber; has strong theoretical
interests; uses interpretive methods and dialogues;
addresses questions of domination and discrimina-
tion; and also engages in cultural critique. Most
important, Habermas provides a rationale for the
humanist conception of the disciplinary identity of
mainstream, in particular North American, cultural
anthropolog¡ which tends to conceive of itself as
not just a human but also a humane science operat-
ing on the assumption that the sciences, in particular
the life sciences, are not equipped to fully deal with
the human world of language, symbolic meaning,
moral responsibiliry and culture.
Its humanistic disciplinary identit¡ its concern
with human dignity and bondage, and its construc-
tivist take on cultural lifeworlds show how strongly
anthropology is rooted in Enlightenment discourse.
Habermas's cosmopolitan theory of reason and cul-
tural anthropology's disciplinary identity converge
because they are both, more or less directlg indebted
to the Enlightenment philosopher Immanuel Kant,
the predominantly neo-Kantian climate of opinion
in late 19th- and early 20th-century academia, the
closely associated hermeneutic tradition, and Max
\Øeber's sociology. These continentâl developments
influenced North American cultural anthropology
through Franz Boas, a German immigrant, and
his pupils Alfred Kroeber and Edward Sapir. Max
'Weber's 
and the French philosopher Paul Ricoeur's
influence on Clifford Geertz's interpretive turn in
the 1970s added to that effect. French ethnologie
and British social anthropology received I(antian
input through Émile Durkheim and Claude
Lévi-Strauss.
Trao Metaphysics
One of the urgent challenges for anthropology
presently is the long-standing tension between
interpretive (hermeneutic) and explanatory
(nomothetic) methodologies. The same goes for
philosophy. Two mutually incompatible metaphysi-
cal traditions keep feeding into these epistemic
stances, one stressing the uniqueness ancl dignity
of human subjectivit¡ the other stressing the con-
tinuity between humans and other animal spe-
cies. Habermas advocates a dialogue and offers a
sophisticated attempt to integrate both approaches
in order to overcome the polarization that holds
anthropology captive. This is highly relevant for a
discipline that has been described as the most scien-
tific of the humanities and the most humanistic of
the sciences and still has not sorted out its contested
disciplinary identity.
Habermas's sustained argument regarding the
possibilit¡ premises, and promise of reasonable
dialogue in society and between cultures, founded
in the universality of human nature, challenges the
tendency of much of anthropology toward cultural
relativism with regard to both truth ând morality.
In particular, it challenges the postmodern, posthu-
manist tendencies of its "textual turn" of the 1.990s,
with its repudiation of grand theory. Habermas
offers reflection on both epistemic and normative
aspects of both humanistic and scientific concep-




while stressing the former view, contributes toward
their conciliation and integration.
Conclusion
There is much in anthropology that is relevant for
a critical evaluation of Habermas's theory of com-
municative rationality. He has been criticized for
his negative casting of nonliterate societies, for his
reconstruction of the cultural evolution of human-
kind, for underestimating the role of conflict and
exclusion, for overstressing the linguistic nature of
human nâture and lifeworlds, for being unrealisti-
cally utopian, and for his Kantian proceduralism-
all in all, for being too Eurocentric in various ways.
But this only adds to the challenge his grand theory
poses to anthropology in its present era of theo-
retical diversit¡ fragmentation, and eclecticism.
Habermas's thought is a major asset for reflexively
scrutinizing the philosophical roots, conceptual
assumptions, disciplinary identiry basic values, and
ethical issues of anthropology.
Raymond Corbey
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Hnurus
In anthropolog¡ the term høbitu.s is primarily asso-
ciated with the work of the French sociologist/
ethnologist Pierre Bourdieu. It is a fundamental ele-
ment in what is referred to as Bourdieu's theory of
practice, or practice theory. According to Bourdieu,
each person embodies a habitus-that is, a configura-
tion of linguistic behaviors, bodily postures and ways
of moving, and emotions, desires, tastes, beliefs, and
values. The habitus is socially produced, acquired in
childhood, and shared by those who have a similar
social background. Although shared, there are some
(albeit limited) individual variations in the ways in
which the habitus is lived and embodied.
Historical Overview
The word habitus has its origins in Latin and at
the most general level refers to both conditions of
the body (including disease) and customary prac-
tices. Although the concept can be traced back to
Aristotle, Bourdieu's notion of habitus builds most
directly on the work of Marcel Mauss, Norbert
Elias, and Erwin Panofsky. In a short essay first pub-
lished in 1936, Mauss used the concept of habitus
to refer to wâys of holding and moving the bod¡
which he called "body techniques."
For Mauss, a "technique" was something tra-
ditional or customar¡ as well as prâcticâl or use-
ful. Body techniques were the product of training
received in a particular social milieu, and it reflected
collective modes of behaviors and values. One of
his examples câme from his observation that during
\7orld 'War I, armies of different nations marched
differently, with their own characteristic movements
of the knee, postures, and so on. These consti-
tute different bodily habitus. Mauss also included
behaviors associated with caring for the body and
dancing as elements of habitus. Body techniques
varied by gender and age as well. Norbert Elias,
also influential in Bourdieu's conceptual framework,
used the concept of habitus in his theory of the
"civilizing proce5s"-a process of socialization at
the individual level and a metahistorical trend that
began in Europe in the court society of the Middle
Ages. According to Elias, in the 19th century, the
bourgeoisie in France, German¡ and other nations
adopted the manners and mannerisms of the earlier
"court society" to express a self-image of their supe-
rioriry and that of their nation as "civilized." Part of
this involved increasing levels of self-reguiation and
self-control of drives and impulses by individuals.
For Elias, habitus was a site for the articulation of
social and mental structures, so that people internal-
ized social constraints and adopted tastes and habits
that were considered "civilized." Habitus for him
was a form of embodied social learning and con-
stituted the social makeup and also self-image of
individuals. Elias, like Mauss, focused primarily on
national identity in his view of habitus, seeing that
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